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THE ABORTION-FUNDING CASES AND
POPULATION CONTROL: AN IMAGINARY
LAWSUIT (AND SOME REFLECTIONS ON
THE UNCERTAIN LIMITS OF
REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY)
Susan Frelich Appleton*

Betty Boe v. Abbot Abraham, President of the City Council of
New Gotham, New Gotham State, et al.
United States Court of Appeals, Special Circuit**
June 20, 1979
Before ADAMS, BAKER, CARSON, DANIEL, and EVERETT,
Senior Circuit Judges.
ADAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Two issues are before us today: (I) the meaning of the term
"medically necessary" in a public hospital's charter and (II) the
constitutionality of state action that provides free medical treatment to indigent pregnant women seeking an abortion but denies
them such assistance for prenatal care and childbirth. On the
basis of recent Supreme Court authority, we find that such action
violates neither the hospital's charter nor the United States Constitution.
The city of New Gotham, a large and crowded metropolis,
owns and operates one hospital, which, pursuant to its charter,
provides "medically necessary services" free of charge for the
* Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law. A.B. 1970, Vassar College; J.D. 1973, University of California, Berkeley.- Ed.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Sonya M. Davis and Patricia
A. Greenfield, students at the Washington University School of Law, and the helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper provided by Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Daniel Noyes
Kirby Professor of Law, and Professors Jules B. Gerard, Patrick J. Kelley, and Ronald
M. Levin of the Washington University School of Law.
** The United States Court of Appeals, Special Circuit, last sat in 1965 in order to
decide Jones & Smith v. Town of New Harmony. See Bittker, The Case of the CheckerBoard Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962). With
Professor Bittker's permission and this author's acknowledged debt to his article, the same
judges - now senior circuit judges eager to resolve another fictitious controversy - have
reconvened to decide the instant case. Any apparent changes in judicial personalities or
writing styles may be attributed to the passage of time and the annual succession of law
clerks.
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city's indigent residents. 1 Alarmed by the recent dramatic increase in New Gotham's population, particularly among the poor,
and by the resulting drain on public services, 2 the City Council
of New Gotham, whose members are duly elected by the city's
residents, has enacted a number of measures designed to encourage population control, consistent with the campaign promises of
several councilmen. 3 Among these measures is a policy directive
requiring the public hospital to cease providing all .medical services related to prenatal care and childbirth. Instead, a physician on the hospital staff is to instruct every woman seeking medical care there in connection with pregnancy that an abortion 4 is
available at any time throughout her pregnancy. 5
In accordance with a longstanding staffing practice, the doctors and medical students at the public hospital's obstetricsgynecology clinic are drawn from the faculty and student body of
the New Gotham Medical School, known nationwide for its work
in population control and related fields; as a result, the medical
1. The hospital is a municipal hospital established under the laws of New Gotham
State and a city ordinance "for the reception of persons requiring relief during temporary
sickness." As an "acute short term general hospital," it does not provide indefinite or
custodial treatment. All residents of the city of New Gotham are entitled to in-patient
admission for any surgical or other procedure which the hospital permits and for the
performance of which it has the proper facilities. Although any city resident may have
any such procedure or treatment performed at the hospital for a specified charge, under
its charter the hospital is to provide all "medically necessary" services at no cost for those
residents who meet the hospital's standards of indigency. Under these standards, an
indigent person or family is one who falls below the federally defined poverty level. See
45 C.F.R. §§ 1060.2-1, .2-2 (1978) (poverty income guidelines). For a description of a
similar municipal hospital, see Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir.),
stay of mandamus denied, 411 U.S. 929 (1973).
2. Though New Gotham is crowded in comparison to other urban areas of roughly
the same size and in recent years has experienced fiscal difficulties, there is no evidence
that either of these problems has approached an emergency condition. Instead, the principal concern is that the city has too many inhabitants to be able to provide the "quality
of life" that a majority of its residents desire.
3. The policy and practice at issue in this case constitute only part of a series of
measures undertaken by New Gotham for the purpose of promoting population control.
The city has, for example, also established throughout the metropolitan area a number
of abortion clinics and family planning agencies operating independently of the public
hospital.
These measures were among those included in the "quality of life" platform espoused
by all of the winning candidates for the City Council in the last municipal election.
4. Neither the New Gotham policy directive nor the physicians on the hospital staff
make a distinction between so-called "therapeutic" and "nontherapeutic" abortions; regardless of any particular indigent woman's physical or emotional reaction to her pregnancy, termination is available as described.
5. The legislature of New Gotham State, in which the city of New Gotham is located,
also eager to encourage reduced reproduction, has repealed all criminal abortion statutes
from the state's penal code, thus legalizing all abortions whenever performed.
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personnel who are asked to comply with the policy directive
strongly support its aims.
Immediately before the filing of this lawsuit, plaintiff Betty
Boe, an indigent resident of New Gotham, consulted a physician
on the public hospital staff who informed her that she was approximately six weeks pregnant and that the hospital would proyide her with an abortion free of charge at any time during her
pregnancy. Boe proceeded unsuccessfully to seek free prenatal
care at the public hospital. 8 Because she still wishes to receive
prenatal care, to carry the pregnancy to term, and to give birth
to the child, but lacks the financial wherewithal to do so, she
brought this action alleging a violation of the hospital's charter
and challenging the constitutionality of the policy directive and
hospital staffing practice that together preclude her from obtaining the desired treatment free of charge.7 Following a trial to
the court, the trial judge found for defendants and dismissed the
complaint with prejudice; Boe appeals.

I
Boe first argues that the policy in question violates the public
hospital's own charter, under which the hospital is to provide the
indigent with all care that is "medically necessary." 8 We disagree.9
6. All parties stipulate that during her initial visit to the hospital Boe was assured
that her request for free childbirth and postpartum treatment would likewise be denied.
At the time this appeal was argued, one month ago, Boe's attorney reported that she was
beginning the seventh month of her pregnancy, that she still desired to deliver rather than
abort, that she met the hospital's standards ofindigency, that she remained unable to pay
for the desired services herself, and that she had not found any alternative means for
obtaining such medical treatment without cost. On the basis of these undisputed facts,
there is no question that this lawsuit satisfies the case or controversy requirement of article
ill of the Constitution.
•
7. Boe filed this civil rights action, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). Her complaint named
as defendants Abbot Abraham, the presiding member of the City Council of New Gotham,
as well as the other members of the Council, and Dr. Clyde Carver, the Director of the
Department of Health and Hospitals and Hospital Commissioner of New Gotham
[hereinafter referred to collectively as "New Gotham" or "the city"]. Boe sought, in the
words of her complaint, declaratory and injunctive relief against "the existence, application, implementation, and enforcement of express and implied policies, rules, regulations,
procedures, and practices barring, thwarting, limiting, and infringing the provision by the
public hospital of New Gotham of free medical treatment related to prenatal care and
childbirth for the indigent residents of the city." For a similarly worded complaint, see
Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975), revd. per curiam, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
8. See note 1 supra.
9. By itself, the construction of the ~ospital's charter would not present a federal
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The United States Supreme Court recently confronted a related issue in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), where it was asked
to construe Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 10 which requires
states participating in its federally funded medical assistance
program for needy persons to formulate "reasonable standards"
for determining the extent of assistance to be provided, consistent
with the objectives of the Act. 11 Pursuant to this requirement,
Pennsylvania had adopted regulations allowing such assistance
for abortions only where certified by physicians to be "medically
· necessary." 12 Elective or nontherapeutic abortions were thus excluded from coverage. A majority of the Court found the regulations to be within the broad discretion accorded to the states by
the Act, reasoning that "it is hardly inconsistent with the objectives of the Act for a State to refuse to fund unnecessary though perhaps desirable - medical services." 432 U.S. at 44445 (emphasis in original).
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that an implicit
corollary of the majority's analysis was that medical services for
childbirth would likewise fall outside the scope of "medically
necessary" treatment if the state were to provide nontherapeutic
abortions for its needy women. 432 U.S. at 451-52. 13 He reasoned
that "[p]regnancy is unquestionably a condition requiring mediquestion appropriate for our consideration. We nonetheless have pendent jurisdiction to
decide the question, because of the close relationship between this issue and plaintiffs
federal constitutional challenge. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). In view of the strong
policy disfavoring the unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions, we address it
first, as did the district court below. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1974).
See also Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385, 1388 app. (D. Mass. 1972),
revd. on other grounds, 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir.), stay of mandamus denied, 411 U.S. 929
(1973). In addition, because of the continuing progression of plaintiffs pregnancy and the
consequent need to resolve this case as expeditiously as possible, we decline to exercise
our discretionary authority to abstain until a state court construction of the charter is
available. See also Zbaraz v. Quern, 572 F.2d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 1978); Hathaway v.
Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d at 705.
10. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k (1976 & Supp. I
1977), establishes the Medicaid program under which participating states may provide
federally funded medical assistance to needy persons. See 432 U.S. at 440.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976).
12. See 432 U.S. at 441-42 n.3. The purpose of the federal statute is to "[enable]
each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to furnish . . . medical assistance on behalf of [those] whose income and resources are insufficient to meet
the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976) (emphasis added). See
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976).
13. Mr. Justice Brennan stated that, under the Court's analysis, "therapeutic" abortions, like care accompanying live births, would also not constitute "necessary medical
services" if elective abortions were available. 432 U.S. at 451-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Using this logic, prenatal care would be "unnecessary" under similar circumstances.
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cal services .
. Treatment for the condition may involve medical procedures for its termination, or medical procedures to bring
the pregnancy to term, resulting in a live birth." 432 U.S. at 449.
Given the two mutually exclusive alternatives for responding to
pregnancy, 14 it is clear that Mr. Justice Brennan is correct: the
availability of one kind of medical procedure - in the instant
case, abortion - necessarily renders the other - childbirth unneeded.
Relying upon a line of reasoning employed by a majority of
the United States Supreme Court and the elaboration of that
reasoning offered by Mr. Justice Brennan, we therefore conclude
that the implementation of the challenged policy directive by the
New Gotham public hospital does not contravene that hospital's
obligation under its charter to provide at no cost to the indigent
all treatment that is "medically necessary."

II
Boe's complaint also raises questions of the right of privacy, 16
due process of law, 16 and equal protection. 17 Relying on Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972), she claims first that the ninth amendment's
reservation of rights to the people 18 shields from state intrusion
14. "'[A]bortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive moral arguments
surrounding the abortion controversy, are simply two alternative medical methods of
dealing with pregnancy . . . .'" 432 U.S. at 449 (quoting Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp,
660, 663 n.3 (D. Conn. 1975), revd. sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)),
15. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60
(1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965). See generally Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for
an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965); Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974); McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations
and Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1965); Silver, The Future of Constitutional
Privacy, 21 ST. Loms U. L.J. 211 (1977).
16. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63
(1973); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term - Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973). See also Moore v. City
of East Cleveland; 431 U.S. 494, 500-04 (1977) (plurality opinion).
17. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541-43 (1942).
18. See Stanleyv. Illinois, 405 U.S. 646,651 (1972); Griswold~- Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 488-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1131 163
(1973).
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her "decision whether to bear or beget a child." 19 She asserts
further that a similar right of privacy, rooted in the fourteenth
amendment's protection of personal liberty and explicitly recognized by.the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973), 20 renders unconstitutional New Gotham's action, which,
she argues, injects the government impermissibly into a private
realm of decision. 21 Finally, Boe contends that the policy directive
and staffing practice of the public hospital create a suspect classification, distinguishing indigent women seeking to abort from
those seeking to carry their pregnancies to term, 22 that jeopardizes
her fundamental right to procreate; 23 because Boe claims that
defendant officials of New Gotham have failed to demonstrate
any compelling state interest or emergency situation justifying
the policy in question, she alleges a violation of the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 24
Although the general constitutional principles that Boe invokes may be correct in the abstract, as current opinions of the
United States Supreme Court demonstrate, 25 they do not invalidate the official action she challenges here, for they do not control
19. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The Court used similar language
in Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
20. See note 16 supra.
21. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 & n.24, 600 & n.26 (1977); Tribe, supra note
16, at 11; Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary and Intimate Decision,
64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447, 1466-69 (1976).
22. See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). She also claims that the city
invidiously discriminates between nonindigent women who can afford to purchase medical
care for childbirth and indigent women who cannot. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
24. If Boe successfully shows that the challenged policy either establishes a suspect
classification or infringes a fundamental right, then she is entitled to invoke the standards
of a mode of equal protection review described as "strict" judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944). Such analysis shifts the burden of proof from the party
challenging the classification and requires the party seeking to uphold it to demonstrate
that it is necessary to further a compelling state interest and that there are available no
less onerous alternatives for achieving that objective. 411 U.S. at 16-17. See also Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
' Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972);
Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1087-131 (1969).
The compelling state interest test is likewise applied outside the equal protection
context in cases where protected rights or liberties are infringed by state action that does
not necessarily classify at all. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 686
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973). See also 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
25. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (equal protection); Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (privacy and due process).
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on the facts of this particular case. We base our conclusion on the
holdings, language, and reasoning employed by the Supreme
Court in its recent decisions in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977),
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S.
519 (1977).
The facts of those cases are not complex and make clear their
pertinence to the controversy before us:
In Beal, which we summarized above, 26 a majority of the
Court, reasoning that elective abortions are not "medically necessary," found no violation of the Social Security Act in Pennsylvania's refusal to extend Medicaid coverage to nontherapeutic
abortions. In reaching that conclusion, the Court emphasized
that, even though under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), governmental interests favoring childbirth are not sufficiently
compelling before fetal viability27 to justify a proscription of
abortions, such interests are of adequate legitimacy and force
throughout pregnancy to support state action designed to encourage a woman to carry to term. 432 U.S. at 445-46.
The Court developed t1iat reasoning further in two other
cases decided the same day. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977),
a majority of the Court28 ruled that the statutory interpretation
announced in Beal does not violate the Constitution and that,
therefore, states participating in the Medicaid program established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act are not constitutionally compelled to finance nontherapeutic abortions when they
choose to pay medical expenses for childbirth. The Court thus
rejected the contention that such an allocation of public funds
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
by discriminating against those indigent women who choose to
exercise the constitutional right to abort instead of carrying their
pregnancies to term. 29 Expanding upon the analysis employed in
26. See text at notes 10-14 supra.
27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973). The Court in Roe defined a viable fetus
as one "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." 410
U.S. at 160.
28. In Beal and Maher, Justice Powell wrote opinions for a majority composed of
himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist, end Stevens.
Chief Justice Burger, though joining in the majority opinion in Maher, submitted a
separate concurrence in that case. 432 U.S. at 481. The main opinion in Poelker v. Doe
was published as a per curiam for the same six members of the Court.
The dissenters in all three cases - Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun filed a number of separate opinions. 432 U.S. at 448 (Brennan, J.); 432 U.S. at 454
(Marshell, J.); 432 U.S. at 462 (Blackmun, J.); 432 U.S. at 482 (Brennan, J.); 432 U.S.
at 522 (Brennan, J.).
29. Plaintiffs in Maher had argued that, under Roe v. Wade, states are required to
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Beal, the majority explained that, although Roe v. Wade and its
progeny may foreclose a state from creating an "absolute obstacle"30 to abortion, particularly during the first trimester, those
cases do not inhibit the democratic31 adoption of policies and
practices favoring one response to the condition of pregnancy,
childbirth, over the alternative, abortion. 32
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), the third case decided
that day, applied the constitutional principle articulated in
Maher to validate both a policy directive of Mayor John Poelker
of St. Louis, Missouri, 33 and a staffing practice of one of St.
Louis's city-owned hospitals34 that together operated to prohibit
nontherapeutic abortions in that public facility. 35 While observing that the mayor's personal opposition to abortion was legally
irrelevant, the Supreme Court found significant the St. Louis
voters' approval of policies preferring childbirth to abortion, exaccord equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth. 432 U.S. at 470.
30. 432 U.S. at 473 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70-71 n.11
(1976) (emphasis deleted)).
31. 432 U.S. at 480.
32. The Court emphasized the distinction between an "absolute obstacle," see note
30 supra, or "unduly burdensome interference with [the] freedom to decide whether to
terminate [a] pregnancy," 432 U.S. at 474, on the one hand, and an official "value
judgment," 432 U.S. at 474, "state encouragement,'' 432 U.S. at 475, or "policy choice,''
432 U.S. at 477, favoring childbirth, on the other. While the former (which includes
criminal penalties !llld withdrawals of all welfare benefits to those exercising the right in
question, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8) must be justified by a compelling state interest, see 432
U.S. at 475-76, the latter (which includes refusals to subsidize the protected activity, 432
U.S. at 474 n.8) needs only to be rational in order to pass constitutional muster, 432
U.S. at 478. In developing this contrast, the Court noted by analogy that, even though
parents have a constitutionally protected right to choose to educate their children in
private schools, a state may nonetheless encourage the selection of public school education
by making it the more attractive alternative through state funding. 432 U.S. at 476-77.
Similarly, the Court contrasted penalties on the exercise of a constitutional right, e.g.,
the right to travel interstate, with failure to subsidize that right for the indigent, e.g., the
failure to provide free bus fares. 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8. While the Constitution may
prohibit the former, it does not require the latter. 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8. See also D-R._ v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978). The Court has continued to employ
the "undue burden" language in subsequent analysis. See Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct.
3035, 3046, 3050, 3051 (1979) (plurality opinion).
33. The directive barred the performance of all abortions in the public hospitals
absent a threat of grave physiological injury or death to the mother. 432 U.S. at 520.
34. For several years, the obstetrics-gynecology clinic at the city hospital in question
had drawn its staff from the faculty and students at the St. Louis University School of
Medicine, a Jesuit-operated institution opposed to abortion. 432 U.S. at 520.
35. In Poetker, plaintiffs challenge to the policy directive and staffing practice had
been "cast •.. in an equal protection mold," 432 U.S. at 520, by the court below, which
had struck down this official action as invidious discrimination against women who cannot
afford to obtain abortions at private hospitals, as distinguished from those who can. 432
U.S. at 520.
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pressed in their election of Poelker. 432 U.S. at 521. Whatever the
right acknowledged in Roe v. Wade, the Court found no constitutional violation in a city's implementation of the policy choices
of its electorate, even if such choices might, as a practical matter,
hinder the exercise of that right. 38
Although the precise issues before the Court in those cases,
the abortion-funding cases, are the mirror image of those presented here, we think the broad governmental discretion approved in Beal, Maher, and Poelker amply supports the value
judgments reflected in the New Gotham public hospital directive
and staffing practice. In those cases, the majority's repeated affirmation of the constitutional validity of a state or local government's expression and implementation of policy preferences favoring childbirth37 intimates that official policy preferences for
precisely the opposite goal would be equally acceptable, at least
from a constitutional perspective. 38 Thus, when the Supreme
Court notes that governmental concerns falling short of compelling state interests afford sufficient constitutional support for refusal to provide abortions at public expense, 39 it suggests that
less-than-overriding governmental concerns would likewise justify excluding treatment for prenatal care and childbirth from
welfare coverage40 - precisely the path chosen by New Gotham.
Similarly, when the Court explains that official value judgments fostering childbirth are appropriately determined on a
democratic basis, 41 it authorizes an electorate to favor an allocation of public funds that promotes abortion instead. Surely, if
voters are to have a choice, the courts must allow them to consider the available alternatives. Here, the collective will of the
36. The Court stressed that Mayor Poelker "is an elected official responsible to the
people of St. Louis," 432 U.S. at 521, whose "policy of denying city funds for
[nontherapeutic] abortions •.• is subject to public debate and approval or disapproval
at the polls." 432 U.S. at 521.
37. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474-77; Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 521. See also
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 445-46.
38. Nowhere in the abortion-funding cases does the majority limit its reasoning to
policy preferences favoring childbirth; it simply presents a series of broad and general
reasons for upholding types of state action that, in those cases, happen to favor the value
of childbirth. The analysis used is sufficiently open-ended to control in a situation in
which abortion ,is selected as the preferred value instead. See Bolner & Jacobsen, The
Right to Procreate: The Dilemma of Overpopulation and the United States Judiciary, 25
LOY. L. REV. 235, 254-55 (1979).
39. E.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 477.
40. See note 38 supra.
41. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 447-48 n. 15; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 480;
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 521.
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residents of New Gotham is apparent from their election to the
City Council of candidates advocating population control. 42 Particularly pertinent here is the Court's specific observation in
Maher that one sort of reason that might prompt valid state
action deviating from "a position of neutrality between abortion
and childbirth" would be "legitimate demographic concerns."
432 U.S. at 478 n.11. Such language is certainly broad enough to
encompass New Gotham's very real concerns regarding the size
of its population and its resulting efforts to limit procreation. 43
In short, even if we concede that Boe and others similarly
situated have a fundamental right, secured by the fourteenth
amendment and embraced within the constitutionally protected
zone of privacy, to decide whether to ~arry their pregnancies to
term or to abort, 44 and even if, as we assume, New Gotham's
interest in curbing population growth is not of a "compelling"
character, 45 still we find no constitutional violation. Like the state
action challenged in Beal, Maher, and Poelker, the actions of the
defendants here do not obstruct absolutely or burden unduly the
exercise of the asserted right. 46 Notwithstanding the policy directive and staffing practice of the public hospital, Boe may still
obtain the medical treatment she seeks. The city's policy preferences do not compel her to terminate her pregnancy now or at any
other time. To paraphrase the language of the Supreme Court,
[t]he State may have made [abortion] a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed
no restriction on access to [childbirth] that was not already there.
The indigency that may make it difficult - and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible -for some women to [carry their pregnancies
to term and deliver their children] is neither created nor in any
way affected by the [city's] regulation.
42. See text at note 3 supra.
43. The demographic concerns in Maher were not so clearly apparent; the majority
in that case never explained whether or not a desire to combat undefPopulation was, in
fact, responsible for Connecticut's policy preference favoring childbirth. But see 432 U.S.
at 489 n.* (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Young Women's Christian Assn. v. Kugler, 342
F. Supp. 1048, 1074 (D.N.J. 1972) (pre-Roe abortion bar successfully challenged; court
rejects state's purported interest in fostering population growth "especially in a densely
populated and heavily urbanized state like New Jersey, with its attendant demographic,
economic, sociological and ecological problems").
44. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
45. See note 2 supra. New Gotham, though emphasizing the importance of its concerns regarding overpopulation, has conceded that its interests are not now of the same
magnitude as those that have been adjudged "compelling" under the fourteenth amendment. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (Powell, J.);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
46. See note 32 supra.
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Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474. There is no controlling authority,
moreover, for the proposition suggested by Boe that her indigency
somehow places her within a "suspect class." 47 As the Supreme
Court has observed, it has never held that "financial need alone
identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis." 432 U.S. at 471.
Of course, even though a state may have considerably
broader power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public
interest than it does to interfere directly with protected activity, 48
we must still determine whether the official action challenged
here satisfies "the less demanding test of rationality that applies
in the absence of a suspect classification or the impingement of
a fundamental right." 432 U.S. at 478. 49 We conclude that New
Gotham has met that test.
First, as we noted earlier, "legitimate demographic concerns
about [a state's or city's] rate of population growth" are sufficient to support governmental "departure from a position of neutrality between abortion and childbirth." 432 U.S. at 478 rt.ll. 6u
The parties have stipulated that there has been a recent increase,
albeit one short of crisis proportions, in the population of New
Gotham; the voters' election to the City Council of candidates
who campaigned on platforms of population control demonstrates
public aware·ness of this phenomenon and public desire to mitigate this trend. 51
Nor is the policy in question irrational as it relates to the
health of New Gotham's pregnant residents. As the Supreme
Court pointed out several years ago, abortions during early pregnancy by competent licensed physicians are now "relatively safe"
and the risks to women undergoing such abortions "appear to be
as low as or lower than . . . for normal childbirth." Roe u. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973). 52 Even with respect to abortions performed after the first trimester, the maternal mortality rate in
47. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
48. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977).
49. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
50. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding undue financial burden on city's schools are legitimate goals); Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (land-use restrictions designed to promote quiet, family
values, and clean air are legitimate).
51. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
52. Though New Gotham provides free abortions in later pregnancy as well, see note
5 supra and accompanying text, any woman choosing to abort may obtain such treatment
as early during her pregnancy as she wishes.
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childbirth exceeds the maternal mortality rate from abortions.
See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 77 (1976).
Similarly, New Gotham's bona fide financial concerns make
this policy a reasonable one. As Mr. Justice Blackmun has observed, "the cost of a nontherapeutic abortion is far less than the
cost of maternity care and delivery, and holds no comparison
whatsoever with the welfare costs that will burden the State for
the new indigents and their support in the long, long years
ahead." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). 53
For these reasons, we reject Boe's constitutional challenges
to the manner in which New Gotham has chosen to operate its
public hospital.
Judges BAKER and CARSON concur; Judge DANIEL concurs in an opinion to be filed at a later time.
EVERET!', Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.

I
I would find the policy directive inconsistent with the hospital's charter. Prenatal care and medical services incident to childbirth are "medically necessary" because, in today's world, that
happens to be the way pregnancies are treated. That is not to say,
as Justice Brennan implies in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 449-52
(1977), that pregnancy is a disease or that prenatal care and delivery are among the "cures" therefor; 1 it is simply to point out a
53. See Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp.1212, 1218 & n.8 (N.D. Ill.) (comparative costs
of state-funded abortion and state-funded childbirth), probable jurisdiction noted sub
nom. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 447 (1979). But see Hardy, Privacy and Public Funding: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. Wade and Dandridge v. Williams, 18 ARiz.
L. REv. 903, 927-32 (1976).

•••••••••••

1. The reasoning used by Justice Brennan in dissent in Beal and relied upon by the
majority in this case is unsound. Abortions performed to terminate pregnancies that
jeopardize a woman's life or health are clearly distinguishable from other abortions. Given
that distinction, the Beal majority's interpretation of "medically necessary" cannot be
reduced to the absurdity that Justice Brennan asserts; where a pregnancy does not present
risks to life or health, an aoortion is no different from any other elective, nonnecessary
medical procedure, unless, of course, pregnancy itself is to be considered a disease that
must be "cured" in every case by some sort of medical treatment. Although there appears
to be no universally accepted definition of "disease," see generally The Concept of Health,
1 THE HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES No. 3, 1973, there is substantial authority for excluding
pregnancy from the reach of that term, whatever the precise boundaries of its meaning.
See, e.g., Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 375 (E.D. Va. 1974) ("pregnancy
is not a disease, as that term is commonly understood"), affd., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.
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fact of American life in this decade. 2 "The pregnancy of the
mother, absent miscarriage, inevitably and biologically terminates in the birth of the child, a process which today at least
requires medical attention and assistance." Roe v. Norton, 522
F.2d 928, 941 (2d Cir.) (Mulligan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), on remand, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975),
revd. sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The availability of free abortions for indigent women does not alter this general
fact although, for any given woman who elects to interrupt the
natural biological course of her pregnancy by abortion, childbirth
will not occur. But such cases tell us nothing about medical necessity in general, nor do they provide a meaningful basis for
analyzing those situations in which no abortion is performed. 3
1975), revd. on other grounds, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500
n.4 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (pregnancy is a physiological process causing o variable degree of disability on an individual basis); Cleveland Bd. of Educ, v. LoFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 652 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("pregnancy is a normal biological function"); T. STEDMAN, STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 401, 1134 (4th Unabr. Lawyers' ed.
1976) (defining "disease" as "[m]orbus; illness; sickness; an interruption, cessation, or
disorder of body functions, systems, or organs" but defining "pregnancy" as "[g]estation;
fetation; cyesis; cyophoria; graviditas; gravidity; the state of a female after conception
until the birth of the baby"). And just as pregnancy itself is not a disease, childbirth, the
would-be "alternative" to abortion, is not "treatment" for pregnancy. See, e.g., id. at
1473 ("treatment" defined as "[t]herapeutics; therapy; the medical or surgical core of o
patient; the institution of measures or the giving ofremedies designed to cure a disease").
Though childbirth restores a pregnant woman to a nonpregnant state and though, today,
it is always accompanied by medical attention and assistance, see note 2 infra, it is not
in itself a medical procedure at all but rather the inevitable and biological end of a
pregnancy in which no abortion, spontaneous or induced, has occurred. In short, childbirth simply "happens," whether a doctor is present or not. See Klein v. Nassau County
Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496,500 (E.D.N.Y.1972), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S.
925 (1973).
See generally Chalmers, Implications of the Current Debate on Obstetric Practice,
in THE PLACE OF BIRTH 44, 47-48 (1978); Antler & Fox, The Movement Toward a Safe
Maternity: Physician Accountability in New York City, 1915-1940, 50 BuLL. H!sT. MED.
569, 571-72 (1976).
2. Periodic medical attention throughout pregnancy and during and immediately
following childbirth is now accepted practice and has contributed significantly to the
decreased maternal and infant mortality rate in this country. See A. GUITMACHER, PRE0·
NANCY, BmTH, AND FAMILY PLANNING 86-89, 335 (1973); Obstetrical Practices in the United
States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate
Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 36-37 (1978) (statement of Donald
Kennedy). See generally Antler & Fox, supra note 1, at 592-94. Today, the children of98%
of American women are delivered in hospitals. See BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BooK
COLLECTIVE, OUR BooIES, OUR SELVES 250 (2d ed. 1976).
See also Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500 (E,D.N,Y,
1972), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 925 (1973); Roe v. Ferguson, 389 F, Supp, 387,
392 (S.D. Ohio 1974), revd. on other grounds, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975).
3. In any event, whether or not any particular medical procedure is "necessary" in a
given case is a determination to be made by a physician, not by any general hospital
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II
A more serious problem is the majority's decision to uphold
official action that, to me, is clearly ~nconstitutional.
Though undoubtedly the States are and should be left free to
reflect a wide variety of policies, and should be allowed broad
scope in experimenting with various means of promoting those
policies, . . . "[t]here are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct . . . experiments at the
expense of the dignity and personality" of the individual . . . . In
this instance these limits are, in my view, reached and pa!3sed.

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U._S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring)).
Were I writing on a clean slate, it would, I believe, suffice for
me to point out that "the right of procreation without state interference has long been recognized as 'one of the basic civil rights
of man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race.'" Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977) (quoting
Skinner u. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 4 New Gotham
has unquestionably interfered with that right by denying to poor
women free medical care for prenatal treatment and childbirth
while providing free abortions, all in the absence of any compelling governmental interest. 5
policy. See also, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192, 197 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163 (1973); Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Jaffe v. Sharp, 463
F. Supp. 222, 228 (D. Mass. 1978), affd. sub nam. Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979). See generally Wood & Durham, Counseling,
Consulting and Consent: Abortion and the Doctor-Patieht Relationship, 4 B.Y.U. L. REv.
783 (1978).
Finally, we should accept plaintiff's construction of the hospital charter in order to
avoid the constitutional difficulties examined in Part II of this opinion. See also, e.g.,
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1972) (plurality opinion).
4. See also, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (parent-child relationship constitutionally protected); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
& Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1977) (importance of biological relationship in defining
"family" for purposes of due process analysis); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (Constitution "protects the sanctity of the family");
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (privacy, protected by substantive aspects of
fourteenth amendment but limited to those rights deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty," encompasses matters relating to, inter alia, procreation);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (essential right to conceive and raise one's children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 168, 166 (1944) (private realm of family life which state cannot enter); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (liberty guaranteed by fourteenth amendment includes
right to "establish a home and bring up children").
6. New Gotham has not maintained that its "overpopulation" has reached crisis
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To validate such interference on the theory that it is a mere
policy preference that satisfies the rational basis test is - as Mr.
Justice Marshall observed in dissent in Beal, Maher, and Poelker
- to employ a constitutional analysis "pull[ed] from thin air."
432 U.S. at 457. Indeed, only eleven days before the decisions in
Beal, Maher, and Poelker were handed down, a majority of the
Court explicitly stated that, even in the absence of an "absolute
obstacle," the compelling state interest test is the proper standard for assessing the constitutionality of governmental action
that implicates the right of privacy by limiting an individual's
access to the means necessary for the exercise of that right. 0 As a
practical matter for the indigent, moreover, no interference with
proportions or that its aim of improving the :'quality of life" of its citizens is compelling.
See majority opinion notes 2 & 45 supra and accompanying text. Nor has the city sought
to establish that the persons whose reproduction might be decreased by this policy are
genetically defective. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Much of the literature examining the constitutionality of programs of population control has concluded that, as burdens on the right to procreate, such programs must advance a compelling state interest.
See, e.g., Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices and Dilemmas, 41
U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 547-48, 571-85 (1972); Kindregan, State Power Over Human Fertility
and Individual Liberty, 23 HAsTINGS L.J. 1401, 1422-23 (1972); Montgomery, The Population Explosion and United States Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 629, 653-59 (1971); Rabin,
Population Control Through Financial Incentives, 23 HAsTINGS L.J. 1353, 1386 (1972);
Comment, Population Control: The Legal Approach to a Biological Imperative, 58 CALIF.
L. REv. 1414, 1431-43 (1970); Note, Legal Analysis and Population Control: The Problem
of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1856, 1880-82 (1971); Comment, Population: The Problem,
the Constitution and a Proposal, 11 J. FAM. L. 319, 332 (1971). The compelling state
interest test has likewise been invoked in analyses of programs designed to promote eugenic goals through restrictions on procreation by certain individuals or groups. See, e.g.,
Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92, 135 (1974); Shaw,
Procreation and the Population Problem, 55 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1977); Vukowich,
The Dawning of the Braue New World - Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of Eugenics,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 207-09; Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The
Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 696, 721-26 (1973).
6. In Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), where a New York statute
restricting the distribution of contraceptives was found unconstitutional, a majority of the
Justices observed:
The significance of these cases [Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)] is that they establish that the same
test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's right to decide
to prevent conception or terminate a pregnancy by substantially limiting access to
tfie means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit
the decision entirely. Both types of regulation "may be justified only by a
'compelling state interest' •.. and ••. must be narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake."
431 U.S. at 688 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)),
Only Justice Powell, in an opinion not joined by any other member of the Court,
suggested that some less exacting standard of review applies where the state action implicates the right of privacy but does not "entirely frustrate[ ] or heavily burden[ ]" its
exercise. 431 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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individual freedom of choice regarding whether or not "to beget
or bear a child" 7 could be more "absolute"8 than the measure
upheld today. For a woman in Boe's financial straits, the medical
treatment she seeks is completely out of reach. Unless we are to
exhume the utterly repudiated9 right-privilege distinction, 10 the
state action before us cannot stand. 11
As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Beal, Maher,
and Poetker, however, the slate upon which I write is not entirely
clean, and a mere recitation of apparently well-settled constitutional principles antedating those decisions is therefore insufficient. But even conceding that some language from those opinions supports the result reached here, that support is at best
superficial. The issues resolved in those cases are very different
from those raised here. 12 The abortion-funding cases held simply
that a state or local government may refuse to provide public
funding for elective abortions; they did not indicate what result
would obtain where the treatment in question relates to childbirth instead.
The error the majority makes is perhaps understandable. As
a result of the Supreme Court's lengthening list of cases concern7. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
8. But see majority opinion notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
9. Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 446 (1977).
10. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1976) (plurality opinion)(citations
omitted):
"[F]or at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a
person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the government may not rely." . . . [O]ne such impermissible
reason [is that the] denial of a public benefit may not be used by the government
for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve what it may not
command directly . . .. "'[T]his Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a
"right" or as a "privilege." ' "
11. One additional difficulty, which Boe does not raise and which the court therefore
does not address, is the possible argument that the city's policy directive and hospital
staffing practice infringe the first amendment rights of those indigent women who oppose
abortion for religious reasons. Were I confronted with that question, I would again conclude that only a revival of the right-privilege distinction, see note 10 supra, could insulate
such state action from otherwise certain constitutional invalidity. See Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("to condition the availability of [governmental] benefits upon
[one's] willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties"). Cf. Note, Abortion, Medicaid, and
the Constitution, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 151-55 (1979) (first amendment problems of
abortion-funding restrictions).
12. See generally L. 'T'ruBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 932 & n.70 (1978).
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ing contraception 13 and abortion, 14 the concept of freedom of
choice in matters of reproduction has come to refer almost exclusively to decisions not to bear children. 15 Clearly, however, such
freedom must encompass as well the decisions of those individuals who do wish to procreate. 16
Mr. Justice Goldberg recognized the inseparable and complementary nature of the two kinds of individual choices more
than a decade ago in his concurring opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where he observed that failure
to accord constitutional protection to the private use of contraceptives by married couples17 would not only intrude upon the
guarantees of the ninth amendment but would also establish an
unacceptable precedent for state and federal limitation of family
size despite the absence of a compelling state interest. 18 That is
13. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
14. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379
(1979); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v,
Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
15. The Supreme Court has heard a comparatively small number of cases directly
raising questions concerning the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 636
(1942); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). A number of cases focusing on other issues have
noted, in passing, rights related to childbearing. See note 4 supra.
16. The Supreme Court acknowledged this point in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472
n.7 (1977), stating that "[a] woman has at least an equal right to choose to carry her
fetus to term as to choose to abort it" (emphasis added).
17. Justice Gl>ldberg wrote of the "basic and fundamental ••• right of privacy in
marriage." 381 U.S. at 491. The holding in Griswold was subsequently extended to unmar•
ried individuals via the equal protection clause. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 406 U.S. 438 (1972),
18. Justice Goldberg reasoned:
The logic of the dissents would sanction federal or state legislation that seems to
me even more plainly unconstitutional than the statute before us. Surely the Government, absent a showing of a compelling subordinating state interest, could not
decree that all husbands and wives must be sterilized after two children have been
born to them. Yet by their reasoning such an invasion of marital privacy would not
be subject to constitutional challenge because, while it might be "silly," no provision of the Constitution specifically prevents the Government from curtailing the
marital right to bear children and raise a family. While it may shock some of my
Brethren that the Court today holds that the Constitution protects the right of
marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe that the personal
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection against such
totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complete variance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law
outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then, by the same
reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid. In
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precisely what has happened today. Just as Mr. Justice Goldberg
feared, the majority here has taken "precedent" from cases limiting an individual's freedom not to bear children, Beal, Maher,
and Poetker, to validate restrictions on the right to procreate. But
"[t]he individual's freedom to . . . reproduce is 'older than the
Bill of Rights.' " 19 Thus, if history and tradition are to play any
role in defining those substantive rights shielded by the due process clause, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion), 20 then surely the longestablished personal right to procreate, an "intrinsic human
right, " 21 should be accorded significantly greater constitutional
protection than the only recently recognized "right to abort. " 22
But even if the reasoning the majority borrows from the
abortion-funding cases were controlling in principle, additional
difficulties would remain.
First, there is a noticeable misfit of the governmental end
identified and the means selected to effectuate that goal. Even if
so-called strict judicial scrutiny is not warranted in a case such
my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of
marital privacy which are constitutionally protected.
381 U.S. at 496-97. See note 5 supra. See also Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Justices
and Connecticut's "Uncommonly Silly Law," 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 680, 699 (1967) ..
19. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
845 (1977) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
20. A plurality of the Court explained in Moore:
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary
lines but rather from careful "respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society." Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S., at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring) . . . . Out decisions establish that the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.
431 U.S. at 503.
A footnote at the end of that passage added, in part, the following:
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court rested its holding in part on
the constitutional right of parents to assume the primary role in decisions concerning the rearing of their children. That right is recognized because it reflects a
"strong tradition" founded on "the history and culture of Western civilization,"
and because the parental role "is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition." Id. at 232.
431 U.S. at 503 n.12.
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, also noted the
significance of "tradition." 4~1 U.S. at 507. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035,
3045 (1979) (plurality opinion); Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504 (1979); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 434 U.S. 816,
845 (1977). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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as this, 23 New Gotham's intrusion into a matter of "family life"
is sufficiently significant to require a court at least to "examine
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
[action]." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499
(1977) (plurality opinion). 24
Granting for the moment that a governmental interest in
reducing crowding may be a legitimate underlying purpose, such
an end is furthered only marginally by New Gotham's denial of
free treatment for childbirth. Certainly, this policy will not discourage the nonindigent from reproducing. 25 And although pregnancy and childbirth today are processes ordinarily attended by
:tnedical assistance, 26 delivery of a living infant can occur outside
a hospital without any medical assistance whatsoever. A woman
in Boe's financial situation, determined not to abort, can in many
cases give birth to her child without a physician's aid. That very
real possibility not only demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the
New Gotham policy but also reveals another flaw as well: Mothers carrying their pregnancies to term and delivering without
medical assistance, as well as children born under such circumstances, are in much greater jeopardy of suffering some kind of
serious physical complication, including death. 27 Surely New
Gotham's interest in reducing overpopulation, even among the
poor, is not permissibly served by increasing risks to the health
23. Compare text at majority opinion note 49 supra with majority opinion note 24
supra.
24. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767-68 (1977) (though "most exacting
scrutiny" not appropriate for reviewing classification disadvantaging illegitimates, challenged state action held unconstitutional because it "bears only the most attenuated
relationship to the asserted goal"); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1972).
25. Those able to afford to pay for prenatal care and medical treatment for childbirth
at a private facility will not be affected in a legal or a practical way by the policy. See
majority opinion note 1 supra. In some small communities, however, such restrictions on
a hospital's services may have a broader impact. See a/so Poetker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519,
524 (1977)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
27. Increased availability and acceptance of good prenatal care as well as the greater
use of hospitals are significant factors in the decreasing maternal mortality rate during
pregnancy, delivery and the six-week postpartum period. A. GUTrMACHER, PREGNANCY,
BIRTH, AND FAMILY PLANNING 86-89 (1973). It is instructive to note in this context, moreover, that in "three of the states with the worst maternal and newborn [mortality J records, Mississippi, Alabama, and Arkansas, nearly one quarter of the births take pince
outside of the hospital." Id. at 87.
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of those individuals evading the city's policy. 28
One can imagine, moreover, more narrowly tailored schemes
under which New Gotham's interests could be advanced - alternative policies both less onerous to individuals in Boe's class and
more carefully designed to achieve the city's asserted objective. 29
For example, New Gotham could instead provide free contraceptives or counseling for family planning; 30 either service would promote the city's goal without burdening those women who are
already pregnant and thus face what must appear to some as a
medical and moral dilemma. 31 For those women in Boe's situation
who oppose abortion but do not care to rear a child themselves,
the city could limit its population by arranging for adoptive
placements in less crowded locales. A number of other possibilities come to mind. 32
Finally, I have grave reservations about another aspect of the
New Gotham policy that Boe does not attack directly: the availability of abortions at any time throughout pregnancy. 33 It is true
that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), held only that a state, if
it desired, could restrict abortions after the first trimester for
reasons related to maternal health, 410 U.S. at 163, and could
prohibit abortions following viability in order to preserve fetal
life, 410 U.S. at 163-64; apparently, nothing in Roe requires states
to enact such protective legislation. Still, I am troubled by the
prospect of the New Gotham public hospital's performing abortions up through the final days of pregnancy.
28. New Gotham, of course, has not asserted nor can we infer that it intends to cure
its population difficulties by increasing the infant and maternal mortality rate occurring
in connection with childbirth. Nor can I believe that the majority would approve any
"modest proposal" along these lines. See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 523-24
(1977)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Cf. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772-73 (1977) (though no compelling interest
need be shown, Court inquires whether classification disadvantaging illegitimates "is
carefully tuned to alternative considerations" or whether it "extends well beyond the
asserted purposes").
30. The family planning agencies and clinics described by the majority in majority
opinion note 3 supra provide services only for a fee.
31. Although under the privacy decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 {1973), abortion and
contraception may appear to be equivalent means of birth control, abortion clearly implicates interests not implicated by contraception. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431
U.S. 678, 690 (1977) (contraception, unlike abortion, does not implicate, inter alia, interest
in protecting potential life).
32. Indeed, if New Gotham's concern is one regarding the sheer number of its inhabitants, the municipal hospital could provide free abortions for all residents and not only
those who are indigent. See majority opinion note' 1 supra.
33. See majority opinion note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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As a woman's pregnancy progresses beyond the point of fetal
viability, an abortion becomes more and more likely to result in
a live birth. 34 Given that fact and in view of the official goal of
promoting population control, I see little difference between New
Gotham State's legalization of post-viability abortions and a
state's rescission of its criminal homicide laws. If there is any
meaning at all to the fourteenth amendment's command that no
state "shall deprive a person of life . . . without due process of
law," then a state cannot take the latter course. 35 Although Roe
draws a bright line between a person and a fetus for purposes of
fourteenth-amendment protection, 410 U.S. at 157-59, the possibility of live births in terminations of advanced pregnancies obscures any such clear distinction between the so-called alternatives, abortion and childbirth, and thus between the constitutional implications of the two procedures.
It is for this reason, in addition to those I offered in Part I of
this opinion, that I think Boe's challenge to the city's interpretation of the hospital charter is correct; at some point in pregnancy,
at least after viability of the fetus, childbirth is a "medically
necessary" procedure, for an "abortion," to the extent that term
implies fetal death, no longer remains an acceptable alternative.
I would therefore strike down the challenged policy as inconsistent with both the hospital's own charter and the United States
Constitution.
DANIEL, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring.
On each issue, I agree with the conclusion reached by Judge
Adams joined by Judges Baker and Carson. But because those
results seem extraordinary, if not ironic, I add the following
thoughts that I believe must be addressed en route.
34. See Hardy, Privacy and Public Funding: Maher u. Roe as the Interaction of Roe

u. Wade and Dandridge u. Williams, 18 ARiz. L. REV. 903, 933-34 n.164 (1976), Cf, Colnutti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (invalidation for vagueness of!egislation imposing medical standard of care to maximize chances of fetal survival).
35. In Roe u. Wade, the Court suggested that the right to life accorded to persons by
the fourteenth amendment requires the states to criminalize the taking of such life. See
410 U.S. at 156-58 & n.54. See also Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1325 (8th Cir,),
("The right to life is fundamental and is protected against unreasonable or unlawful
takings by the procedural due process safeguards of the fifth and fourteenth amendments."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978).
***• **
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I
The question of "medical necessity" is, in my view, far more
difficult than either the majority or the dissenting opinion intimates. It raises a number of problems that neither analysis fully
explores.
The majority's complete and unquestioning reliance on the
opinions in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), merits initial attention. The narrow issue before the Court in Beal was whether
Pennsylvania could, consistent with Title XIX of the Social Security Act, distinguish "medically necessary" abortions from other
abortions. 1 Certainly from a lay or intuitive perspective, such a
distinction is not totally unsupportable: one can easily imagine a
woman seeking to terminate a life-threatening ectopic pregnancy;2 an abortion performed under such circumstances would
be meaningfully described as "medically necessary." 3 Such a case
1. Pursuant to the regulations challenged in Beal, Pennsylvania limited Medicaid
assistance "to those abortions that are certified by physicians as medically necessary."
432 U.S. at 441.
2. In an ectopic pregnancy, gestation occurs in a site other than the uterine cavity,
typically in a Fallopian tube. Once diagnosed, "abdominal operation is necessary at
once." A. GUTTMACHER, PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND FAMILY PLANNING 125 (1973). See T. STEDMAN, STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1134 (4th Unabr. Lawyers' ed. 1976).
3. Title XIX of the Social Security Act speaks in terms of medical necessity in
identifying those persons eligible for Medicaid assistance (persons with "insufficient . . .
income and resources to meet the costs of necessary medical .•. services") and not in
describing the precise kinds of medical services to be funded under the Act. 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976). Compare Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d
928, 933 (2d Cir. 1975), with 522 F.2d at 939 (Mulligan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), on remand, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), revd. sub nom. Maher v. Roe,
432 .U.S. 454· (1977).
Although the Pennsylvania regulation at issue in Beal purportedly provided financial
assistance only for those abortions deemed "medically necessary," it is unclear whether
the specifications listed in the regulation in fact comport with that description. For example, abortions performed under circumstances where continued pregnancy would jeopardize the mental health of the mother appear not to be covered unless the pregnancy
resulted from "statutory or forcible rape or incest." 432 U.S. at 441 n.3. If mental or
psychological factors are sufficient to create medical necessity under some circumstances,
however, it makes little sense to ignore such factors under other circumstances, as the
Pennsylvania regulation apparently requires; on the other hand, if mental health always
presents an appropriate consideration, it is unclear what a special provision for rape and
incest adds to the regulation. In addition, the Pennsylvania regulation does provide funding for abortions where "[t]here is documented medical evidence that an infant may be
born with incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency ...•" 432 U.S. at 441
n.3. Whatever one may think of the desirability of terminating a pregnancy in such a case,
it is not self-evident that such a termination is a matter of medical necessity since continuation of the pregnancy presents no immediate health threat to the mother and any
perceived "threat" to the well-being of the fetus caused by the likely abnormalities is
outweighed by the greater threat of fetal death posed by the abortion. Cf. Becker v.
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is, moreover, easily distinguishable from a termination of pregnancy sought solely for reasons of maternal convenience. 4
Given that narrow issue, the majority in Beal properly began
its analysis by considering Pennsylvania's effort to differentiate
two classes of abortions. Resolving that question should have
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (rejecting child's
asserted fundamental right to be born as a whole, functional human being), revg., Park
v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977); Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977
Term - Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 48 n.186
(1978) (differing public opinions regarding abortions where pregnancy poses threat to
mother's physical health and abortions where the baby might be born deformed).
Perhaps the Supreme Court saw Pennsylvania's goal as one of fostering only "normal
childbirth," 432 U.S. at 446 (emphasis added), and not one of defining medical necessity.
See Doe v. Mundy, 441 F. Supp. 447, 451 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (unsuccessful challenge to
county's refusal to fund abortions where pregnancy resulted from rape or incest or when
infant may be deformed). But whether or not the regulation challenged in Beal provides
an accurate catalogue of "medically necessary abortions," I am satisfied that that term
is not meaningless and is susceptible of codification. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191·
92 (1973).
Cf., e.g., Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 126-27, 134 (1st Cir.) (Massachusetts's limiting Medicaid funding only to life-saving abortions unreasonable and antithetical to medical definition of medical necessity; federal "Hyde amendment" substantively alters Medicaid Act), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979); Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d
1362, 1366 (4th Cir. 1978) ("therapeutic abortions" include all those where pregnancy
poses "substantial endangerment to health"; "endangerment to life" standard ambiguous and too narrow); Zbaraz v. Quern, 572 F.2d 582, 584-85 (7th Cir. 1978) ("plainmeaning" semantic distinction between "necessary for the preservation of life" and
"necessary for the preservation of health"); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (reimbursement for less than all medically necessary abortions inconsistent with
objectives of Title XIX; Hyde amendment does not substantively limit Title XIX);
Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 499-502 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania cannot limit
Medicaid funding only to those abortions necessary to save mother's life; Title XIX
requires states to provide all medically necessary abortions); D __ R __ v. Mitchell,
456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978) (reasoning in Beal v. Doe validates Utah's limited abortion funding for only those abortions necessary to save the life of a mother); Doe v.
Mundy, 441 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (county may choose to fund only those abortions where pregnancy threatens mother's life); Emma G. v. Edwards, 434 F. Supp. 1048,
1050 (E.D. La. 1977) (stipulation that, inter alia, "[t]herapeutic abortions are recognized
as medically necessary procedures"); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443,454,
398 A.2d 587, 592 (Ch. Div. 1979) ("medically necessary abortions" include those where
pregnancy endangers life or health); Butler, The Right to Medicaid Payment for Abortion,
28 HASTINGS L.J:931, 953-61 (1977) (pre-Beal, Maher, and Poe/her analysis of "medically
necessary" in the abortion context); Note, State Restrictions on Medicaid Coverage of
Medically Necessary Services, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 1491, 1495-502, 1510-16 (1978) (abortionfunding restrictions in light of analysis of "medical necessity"); Note, Abortion, Medicaid,
and the Constitution, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 135 (1979) (taxonomy of possible abortion•
funding restrictions).
4. See Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1221 (N.D. Ill.) ("medically necessary"
abortions constitute only one fifth of cases in which pregnant woman desires an abortion),
probable jurisdiction noted sub nom. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 447 (1979). Judge
Everett recognizes this point in his dissent, see dissenting opinion note 1 supra. See also
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 450-51 n. * (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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been the end of the matter. 5 But because of arguments raised by
the plaintiffs and Title XIX's requirement of reasonableness, 6 the
Court in Beal proceeded to compare abortions with childbirth.
Noting the state's "important and legitimate interest . . . in protecting . . . human life, " 7 the Beal majority shifted its focus from
therapeutic versus elective abortions to elective abortions versus
childbirth, 8 thereby suggesting that the latter pair somehow constitute alternative medical responses to a single condition, pregnancy.
But such a shift in focus is misleading. Nothing in Beal indicates that the Pennsylvania regulation was prompted by the
eventual availability of alternative services for pregnant women
or even that the state's interest in protecting human life played
a role in the drafting of the regulation. 9 With all due deference to
the Justices of tlie Supreme Court, the more obvious and sensible
basis for upholding the Pennsylvania regulation as "reasonable"
lies in the fact that, for some women, pregnancy presents no
medical difficulty while, for others, the condition may be life- or
health-threatening and thus may require medical treatment. 10
Pennsylvania simply undertook to provide assistance in the latter
5. It is unnecessary, for purposes of this analysis, to determine how the Court should
have resolved the issue in Beal, given a clear focus on the precise question presented. See
note 3 supra.
6. In challenging the statute, plaintiffs had argued that, because childbirth presents
greater health risks and is costlier than abortion, the exclusion of non therapeutic abortions
from Medicaid coverage was unreasonable, in violation of the requirements of Title XIX,
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976). See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 (1977).
7. 432 U.S. at 445-46.
8. See 432 U.S. at 445-46.
As one court has observed, the Court in Beal "provided no direct response to [thej
contentions" that the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from Medicaid coverage was
unreasonable on both economic and health grounds. D__ }L_ v. Mitchell, 456 F.
Supp. 609, 618 (D. Utah 1978).
9. In its briefs, Pennsylvania did not seek to justify its regulation on this basis but
invoked other grounds instead. Brief for Petitioners and Reply Brief for Petitioners, Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). But see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (Pennsylvania's defense of other abortion restrictions suggests goal of fetal protection); Roe v.
Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 501 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania refuses to finance nonlifesaving abortions because of "moral repugnance" felt by state legislature). Arguably, reasons
related to the protection of potential life prior to viability were not offered in Beal because
they may have appeared to have been foreclosed by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150-52
(1973). See generally Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme
Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1196 (1978); Comment, Equal
Protection and Welfare Legislation: The Need for a Principled Approach, 1 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 323, 342 (1978).
10. See Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 940 (2d Cir.) (Mulligan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), on remand, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), revd. sub nom.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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category .11 That a pregnancy presenting no medical difficulties
will ultimately result in childbirth is irrelevant. The Beal majority thus not only obscured the relatively simple issue before it but
also gratuitously invited the conclusion, articulated by Justice
Brennan and then adopted by the majority in this case, that
provision of abortions renders medical services related to childbirth medically "unnecessary." 12
Though I therefore find the logic in Beal questionable with
respect to the precise issue presented by that case, such reasoning
carries considerably more force on the facts before us today. The
New Gotham public hospital charter, unlike the Pennsylvania
regulation, speaks not of medically necessary abortions, but
rather of medically necessary services in general. 13 Regardless of
what constitutes standard medical practice in American obstetrics today, a factor that the dissent in this case considers
determinative, 14 prenatal care and medical assistance related
to childbirth are certainly "unnecessary" - medically or otherwise - for any woman who is not pregnant. For each indigent
pregnant woman in New Gotham who accepts the offered abortion, then, such prenatal and delivery services become not only
"unnecessary" but also impossible to perform. Some such
women, of course, may reject the free termination of pregnancy
offered by the city. The question then becomes whether under
those circumstances "medically necessary" services must include
prenatal care and procedures incident to childbirth. Despite my
own feeling that the New Gotham policy is unwise and perverse,
I must answer that question in the negative. Considerations of
fairness, akin to those underlying estoppel, 15 preclude a woman
who could have voluntarily obviated all need for such services
from arguing that, as a result of her choice to forgo that opportunity, those services·have become "necessary." 18 Any other conclusion would drain that term of all meaning.
11. I put aside the question whether the Pennsylvania regulation challenged in Beal
provides a suitable tool for attaining the presumed governmental goal. See note 3 supra.
12. See majority opinion notes 13-14 supra.
13. See majority opinion note 1 supra and accompanying text.
14. See dissenting opinion notes 2-3 supra and accompanying text
15. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 691 (4th ed. 1971).
16. In such cases, the continuation of pregnancy and consequent eligibility for prenatal and delivery care are voluntary, even if conception was not. Cf. Gilbert v. General Elec.
Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 375 (E.D. Va. 1974) (condition of pregnancy not "voluntary" simply
because statistically low birth rates indicate "pregnancy can to a large extent be
avoided"), affd., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), revd., 429 U.S. 125 (1976). There may be,
of course, some indigent pregnant women who do not abort because they never learn of
their opportunity to do so. See Note, The Abortion Alternatiue and the Patient's Right to
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II
Likewise, on the constitutional question, I feel compelled to
join the majority, though only .after considerable further examination of the issue.
The analysis in Judge Adams's opinion, although seemingly
unfamiliar, is not, as Judge Everett claims, something "pull[ed]
from thin air." 17 Its roots can be traced back several years to the
Supreme Court's decision in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), upholding the constitutionality of a Maryland regulation
that imposed a $240 or $250 ceiling on assistance to a single
family under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. Plaintiffs in that case had challenged the regulation as a
violation of the equal protection clause on the theory that it classified families according to size and deprived members of large
families of aid sufficient to meet their subsistence requirements,
as determined by the state's "standard of need" formula. 18 In
refuting that challenge, the Court found the system justifiable on
a number of valid and rational bases asserted by the state, 19 including Maryland's desire to provid~ "incentives for family planning," 397 U.S. at 484~
Not only does Dandridge stand for the proposition that the
minimally demanding rational basis test governs a state's allocation of its limited public funds, 20 but --: like Beal, Maher, and
Poelker - it also endorses official involvement in matters of reproductive control, 21 even without the support of a compelling
state interest, so long as that official involvement falls short of
Know, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 167. One can imagine, for example, an indigent pregnant
woman who, unaware of the policy directive and not desiring prenatal care, delays her
initial visit to the hospital until labor has commenced. Although in such circumstances
the opportunity to obviate the "need" for medical assistance related to childbirth may
seem more questionable, Boe, and thus the class she represents, does not fall within this
category. The mere possibility of such cases, I think, provides no answer for this lawsuit
but does raise difficult questions concerning whether it is ever "too late" in a woman's
pregnancy for an abortion. See notes 51-72 and accompanying text infra.
17. See text following dissenting opinion note 5 supra.
18. The Court explained the mechanics of the challenged state action, 397 U.S. at
473-75.
19. The Court stated explicitly that, since the action in question lay in the "area of

economics and social welfare," it could withstand the equal protection challenge upon the
showing of any "reasonable basis." 397 U.S. at 485.
20. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977).
21. Commentators have read Dandridge as a case authorizing limited governmental
intrusion into individual decisions regarding family planning and procreation. Shaw,
Procreation and the Population Problem, 55 N.C. L. REv. 1165, 1168 (1977); Note, Legal
Analysis and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1856, 185662 (1971): But see Rabin, Population Control Through Financial Incentives, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 1353, 1361 (1972).
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imposing outright restrictions on individual choice. 22 More significantly, Dandridge also establishes that governmental interests in
limiting family size may be among the legitimate state objectives
satisfying the rationality standard.
This reading of Dandridge was invoked four years later by
Mr. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), as authority for the
proposition that "[u]ndoubtedly Congress could . . . constitutionally seek to discourage excessive population growth by limiting tax deductions for dependents." 414 U.S. at 651. Though the
means for promoting population control selected by New Gotham
differs from both the vehicle sanctioned in Dandridge and that
approved by Powell in LaFleur, the point is clear: The Constitution permits a state, for reasons less than compelling, 23 to seek to
influence individual procreative decisions, at least through less
absolute means than total prohibitions. 24 New Gotham has done
22. The inquiry in Dandridge was confined to "incentives for family planning." 397
U.S. at 484 (emphasis added). See generally Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equality:
Legislative Classifications, Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 494, 513-14 n.102 (1977); Note, supra note 21, at 1858-60.
23. Some elaboration of the compelling state interest doctrine becomes necessary
here. The standard invocations of this test fail to make clear whether the compelling
character of a particular governmental interest stems from some intrinsic feature of that
interest itself, regardless of the surrounding circumstances, or whether those surrounding circumstances help determine the compelling or noncompelling nature of the interest,
The phrase "compelling state interest" suggests the former. The timetable adopted in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973), however, under which various state interests
mature to an ultimately compelling point as a woman's pregnancy progresses, suggests
that it is not some inherent characteristic of the interest itself that renders it compelling
but rather some additional factor. Thus, while state interests in population control may
become compelling in certain emergency situations of extreme and severe overcrowding,
defendants do not argue that such interests are compelling under the circumstances
extant in New Gotham. See majority opinion notes 2 & 45 supra and accompanying text.
Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (Powell, J.) ("interest
of diversity is compelling in the context of a university's admissions program"); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (military urgency, during time of war with
Japanese Empire, renders governmental interest in security sufficiently compelling to
justify exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from West Coast).
24. The Court's language in Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1978),
decided immediately before the abortion-funding cases and cited by Judge Everett in his
dissent, dissenting opinion note 6 supra, while presenting some analytical inconsistencies,
is not necessarily to the contrary. Though the Court in that case confronted legislation
limiting access to contraceptives rather than barring their use, the statutory scheme did
prohibit the distribution of contraceptives under certain circumstances end provided
criminal penalties for violations of that prohibition. Thus, the legislation invalidated in
Carey resembles much more closely the "absolute obstacles" struck down in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), than the positive financial incentives designed to encourage one
choice over its alternative, at issue in the abortion-funding cases and before us in the
instant appeal. It is the use of criminal sanctions that apparently renders an obstacle
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no more. 25
The analysis in Dandridge and LaFleur not only presages the
reasoning adopted in the abortion-funding cases but also harmonizes with a number of suggestions offered by commentators for
encouraging decreased reproduction. 26 Instead of responding to
perceived problems of undue population growth by recommending strict limitations on family size, these commentators advocate programs designed to restructure the incentives and disincentives that presently seem to favor reproduction. 27 Thus, for
example, such diverse laws as the tax exemptions for dependent
children and prohibitions on homosexual marriages might be altered to encourage, though not to compel, decreased procreation. 28 Official adoption of such an incentive system would presumably be consistent with the language of Dandridge and with
Justice Powell's reading thereof and, consequently, would be
immune from the almost-always-fatal application of strict judicial scrutiny. 29 It would, moreover, find particularly strong and
fresh support in the kind of reasoning used in Beal, Maher, and
Poelker, 30 which commits such matters to majoritarian determination.31 New Gotham's policy directive and manner of staffing
impermissibly "absolute" or "direct." See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 n.7
(1979). See also Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 780 (1978)
(denial of all welfare funds to those exercising protected right constitutes impermissible
penalty); Hardy, Privacy and Public Funding: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v.
Wade and Dandridge v. Williams, 18 Aruz. L. REV. 903, 912 n.51 (1976).
25. See text at majority opinion note 46 supra.
New Gotham is seeking not to discourage childbirth itself but rather to achieve a rate
of population growth it deems desirable. Compare Perry, supra note 9, at 1196, with Note,
Abortion, Medicaid, and the Constitution, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 129-30 (1979).
26. See Note, supra note 21, at 1874-75. The author classifies such proposals as part
of a "regulationist," as distinguished from "voluntarist," approach to population control,
while noting the "conceptual fuzziness" of the two categories. Id. at 1870. Similar suggestions appear in Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices and Dilemmas,
41 U. C1N. L. REv. 529, 567-71 (1972), and Rabin, supra note 21. See also Emerson, Nine
Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 M1cH. L. REV. 219, 232 (1965).
27. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 21; Note, supra note 21, at 1870.
28. For additional suggestions, see Barnett, The Constitutionality of Selected Fertility Control Policies, 55 N.C. L. REv. 357 (1977); Driver, Population Polifies of State
Governments in the United States: Some Preliminary Observations, 15 V1LL. L. REV. 818
(1970); Rabin, supra note 21; Shepard, Federal Taxation and Population Control, 55 N.C.
L. REv. 385 (1977); Note, supra note 21, at 1874 n.83. See Dembitz, Should Public Policy
Give Incentives to Welfare Mothers to Limit the Number of Their Children?, 4 FAM. L.Q.
130 (1970).
29. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 8 (1972).
30. See text at majority opinion notes 26-36 supra.
· 31. Beal, Maher, and Poelker arguably return to the political process decisions that
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. its municipal hospital constitute precisely the sort of politically
fashioned incentive system that such an approach suggests.
Judge Everett's effort to distinguish on the basis of history
and tradition the right to prevent or terminate a pregnancy, on
the one hand, from the right to bear children, on the other, 32 does
not compel a different conclusion. Allowing a woman some measure of reproductive freedom, including a limited right to abort,
did not begin with Roe u. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). As the
Court's opinion in Roe points out, "at common law, at the time
of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major
portion of the 19th century, . . . a woman enjoyed a substantially
broader right to terminate a pregnancy" 33 than she did immediately before Roe was decided. In other words, given the analysis
in Roe, historical considerations alone will not provide sufficient
support for the line Judge Everett seeks to draw. But even if such
a distinction were tenable, there is another reason why Judge
Everett's reliance on cases like Moore u. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977), misses the mark: Although Moore did emphasize the constitutional significance of "history and tradition,"
it did so in the context of striking down a city's absolute prohibition of certain kinds of family living arrangements. 34 Neither
Moore nor the other cases Judge Everett cites, however, provide
that history and tradition must limit a city in its selection of
policy preferences or value judgments, the kind of official action
at issue here. 35
Of course, the tacit thrust of Judge Everett's reasoning may
be that the Supreme Court's language in Moore, together with the
holdings of Beal, Maher, and Poelker, indicates some sort of withdrawal from the broad pronouncements of Roe. That is, perhaps
the emphasis in. Moore on traditional or "basic values" 36 and the
the Supreme Court had committed to individual choice in Roe v. Wade. See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 929-32 (1978),
32. See text at dissenting opinion notes 12-22 supra.
33. 410 U.S. at 140. See Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbra/
or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative
Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971). But see
Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807,
815-27 (1973). See generally J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA (1978).
34. 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion). Those violating the ordinance struck down in
Moore could stand convicted of a criminal offense. See 431 U.S. at 496 (plurality opinion),
35. See dissenting opinion notes 16-22 supra and accompanying text. But see United
States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (congressional effort to favor
traditional living arrangements through food stamp program held unconstitutional),
36. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)),
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''sanctity of the family," 37 along with the Court's apparent "antiabortion" rulings in the abortion-funding cases, constitutes a
departure from the position embraced in Roe. 38 Read in that manner, Beal, Maher, and Poelker would offer no support for the
result we reach here. Although a numb~r of critics of the abortionfunding cases have indeed described them in this fashion, 39 I am
reluctant to draw a conclusion that so completely contradicts the
Supreme Court's own assertion that these decisions '~signal[ ] no
retreat from Roe or the cases applying it." 40 I leave to future
students of the Court's recent decisions - and to the Court itself
- the task of determining whether such far-reaching implications
are to be read from between the lines of explicit statements to the
contrary.
Nor am I persuaded by Judge Everett's effort to undercut the
public hospital policy on the ground that it is not sufficiently
tailored to the purpose for which it was adopted. First, as a mechanism for promoting population control, it is at least as effective
as the policies upheld in Beal, Maher, and Poelker were for encouraging childbirth. 41 In those cases, as in the situation before
us, the policy in question had an impact only upon the poor. 42 The
37. 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion).
38. Perhaps Judge Everett suggests that the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade deviates
so significantly from American tradition that "it [cannot] long survive," Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)), and that the abortion-funding cases
reflect the beginning of its demise.
39. See, e.g., L. ThmE, supra note 31, at 933-34 n.77; Clark, Legislative Motivation
and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN Dmao L. REV. 953, 1012, 1019
(1978); Perry, supra note 9, at 1191; Simson, Abortion, Poverty, and the Equal Protection
of the Lauis, 13 GA. L. REv. 505 (1979); Susman, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton Revisited
in 1976 and 1977 - Reviewed?; Revived?; Revested?; Reversed?; or Revoked?, 22 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 581 (1979); 7 CAP. U. L. REv. 483 (1978); Note, Denial of Public Funds for
Nontherapeutic Abortions, 10 CONN. L. REv. 487, 500-07 (1978); Note, The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 144-45 (1977); Note, Medicaid Funding for Abortions: The Medicaid Statute and the Equal Protection Clause, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421, 43841 (1978); 21 How. L.J. 937, 948-49 (1978); 24 Lov. L. REV. 301, 307 (1978); Note, Indigent
Women - What Right to Abortion?, 23 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REv. 709, 739 (1978); 52 TuL. L.
REV. 179, 187-88 (1977); 13 TuLsA L.J. 287 (1977).
Cf. Canby, Government Funding, Abortions, and the Public Forum, 1979 AR1z. ST.
LI 11 (suggesting analogy of the public forum to resolve difficulties of abortion-funding
cases); Hardy, supra note 24, at 919 (suggesting, but ultimately rejecting, "hybrid" constitutional approach to require public funding of abortions).
40. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977).
41. See Simson, supra note 39, at 513; Note, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV., supra note 39, at
441.
42. Indeed, this fact ·may serve to enhance the legitimacy of New Gotham's policy.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), upheld the constitutionality of compulsory sterilization
of the "feebleminded" on the theory that those who "sap the strength of the State" could
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fact that other avenues for procuring the desired medical treatment were available to the nonindigent did not prompt the Court
in Beal, Maher, and Poelker to question the legitimacy of the
vehicle used to achieve the asserted goal. 43 Indeed, under the very
relaxed standard of review applied by the Court in the abortionfunding cases, it is not clear that any means-end fit need be
examined at all. 44
And, to the extent that Judge Everett suggests that the flaw
in the public hospital policy lies in its failure to encourage abortion in each New Gotham pregnancy, Supreme Court authority
is clearly to the contrary. It is well established that, when a state
or local government embarks upon a program of reform, it is not
constitutionally compelled to "strike at all evils at the same
time." 45 In other words, reform "may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute . . . . " 46 The possibility of additional or more far-reaching
ways to reduce New Gotham's population does not undermine the
legitimacy of the means selected.47
be required to make such "sacrifices." 274 U.S. at 207. If Buck remains sound, the less
onerous policy directive of New Gotham, because it does only affect the indigent, could
be supportable on a similar theory. See also Bolner & Jacobsen, The Right to Procreate:
The Dilemma of Overpopulation and the United States Judiciary, 25 LOY. L. REV, 236,
245 (1979).
43. The Court noted in Maher that even indigent women desiring abortions could still
seek such treatment from private sources. 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). See Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438, 459 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. The Court merely inquired whether the "distinction drawn between childbirth
and nontherapeutic abortion . . . [was] 'rationally related' to a 'constitutionally permissible' purpose." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 478.
45. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39 (1973); Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966). See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 57-58 (1977);
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87
(1970).
46. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39 (1973).
47. Even reform undertaken on a piecemeal basis is, of course, subject to equal
protection limitations. Thus, for example, a preliminary step in a broader population
control program singling out blacks for decreased procreation would evoke rigorous judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 536,
541 (1942); Shaw, supra note 21, at 1166. See also Califano v. Westcott, 99 S. Ct. 2666,
2663 (1979) ("Congress may not legislate 'one step at a time' when that step is drawn along
the line of gender"). But alleged classifications based on indigency do not trigger such
stringent review. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977).
Boe's plight, like that of the women challenging the restrictions in the abortionfunding cases, is that without state assistance she can afford to purchase neither an
abortion nor medical care incident to childbirth. Given its discretion regarding the expenditure of its public funds, however, New Gotham could have chosen to subsidize
neither choice. Clearly, Boe does not argue, nor could she, that the Constitution requires
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It is of no moment, moreover, to observe that even poor
women can continue to reproduce without any medical assistance
whatsoever. 48 An analogous point, when made in the abortionfunding cases, carried negligible constitutional weight. 49 Indeed,
the fact that even indigent women can choose to carry their pregnancies to term demonstrates the nonabsolute nature of the burden imposed upon them by the city. And, as the opinion for the
majority in this case explains, it is precisely this nonabsolute
nature of the burden that sustains the policy and practice in
question. 50
Essentially identical reasoning, with slight elaboration, answers Judge Everett's final point, where he questions New
Gotham State's allowing abortions to be performed throughout
pregnancy - a necessary condition for the effective implementation of the city's policy directive. 51
Judge Everett's concern apparently stems from the possibility that an abortion performed during advanced pregnancy might
result in a live birth. If that be the case, however, New Gotham
State's lack of legislation prohibiting abortions is irrelevant, for
upon birth, a "person" within the scope of the state's homicide
laws has come into existence. 52 Whether or not ~he fourteenth
amendment requires a state to impose criminal penalties for depriving such "persons" of life53 is also irrelevant, for New Gotham
states or cities to provide medical assistance for all indigent pregnant women: See 432 U.S.
at 480 n.13.
48. See text at dissenting opinion notes 26, 27 supra.
49. In dissent in the abortion-funding cases, Justice Marshall predicted that the
Court's holdings would result in the procurement of more unsafe and illegal abortions by
the indigent. 432 U.S. at 455-56 n.1.
50. See majority opinion note 32 and text at majority opinion note 46 supra.
51. The absence of any state criminal prohibitions against abortion permits the policy
directive to operate in a noncoercive manner (i.e., simply to encourage abortions rather
than to compel them) and simultaneously to maximize each indigent pregnant woman's
opportunities to choose the result favored by the city.
52. Before birth, however, no such "person" exists. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
157-59 (1973), and cases cited therein. See also Commonwealth v. Edelin, __ Mass.-,
359 N.E.2d 4, 12 (1976) (state manslaughter statute construed, in light of Roe, to apply
only after live birth and only to defendant's acts in postnatal period). Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83-84 (1976) (criminal failure to protect livebom infant
"surely will be subject to prosecution . . . under the State's criminal statutes").
53. Although the matter is not free from uncertainty, the Court in Roe read the
fourteenth amendment not merely to authorize governmental protection of a person's life
but to "entitle" him to such protection from the state. See 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). But
see L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 929 n.61 (noting state action problem in such reasoning);
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the I[ourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. '{, 17 (1969) ("The due process
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State has not repealed its criminal homicide laws, but only its
abortion prohibitions.
The problem that arises, however, is that where live births
do in fact result from the abortions encouraged by the city, the
single goal of the official action challenged here, population control, is not advanced. The question, as I see it, then becomes
whether this incongruity of means and end renders the policy
directive unconstitutional because it is irrationa!G' as applied to
women whose pregnancies have advanced so far that any termination might yield a live birth.
The problem is complicated by the ambiguity of the term
"abortion" itself. In the more typical lawsuit where plaintiffs
challenge state action alleged to restrict their freedom of choice
in aborting pregnancies, a number of personal privacy-based interests can be asserted. The classic case of this variety, Roe u.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), considered such personal interests as
the possibility of direct harm from pregnancy and the future
stress, both physical and psychological, of maternity and child
care. 55 A more specific focus emerged in Planned Parenthood u.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), where, in overturning Missouri's
spousal consent requirement, the Court emphasized the privacy
interest attributable to a woman's direct and immediate physical
involvement in pregnancy. 58 Theoretically, the kinds of interests
recognized by the Court in those cases could be honored by a
termination of pregnancy simpliciter, regardless of the fate of the
fetus, or by placement of any live-born child for adoption.G7
But as the instant case - as well as cases concerning abortions for eugenic reasons 58 - indicates, a preference for abortion
clause inveighs only against certain 'deprivations' by the 'state,' occurrences which seemingly cannot occur by mere default."); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term - Fore•
word: Toward a Model of ~oles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1,
33 n.144 (1973). Cf. Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.) (allegation that police
officers, under color of state law, unreasonably deprived deceased of life presents cognizable claim that fourteenth amendment has been transgressed), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912
(1978).
54. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
55. See 410 U.S. at 153. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3048 (1979) (plurality opinion); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
56. See 428 U.S. at 71.
57. In other words, satisfaction of the interests identified in Roe and Planned
Parenthood do not require that an abortion cause fetal death. See Note, Choice Rights
and Abortion: The Begetting Choice Right and State Obstacles tq Choose in Light of
Artificial Womb Technology, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 877, 899-900 (1978). See also Tribe, supra
note 53, at 27.
58. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz,
46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d
846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1976),
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over childbirth can be motivated by interests other than those
satisfied by mere return of the woman's body to its nonpregnant
state or by obviation of child-rearing responsibilities. 59 In these
cases, the sole immediate purpose for which the abortion is performed is feticide. Where a pregnancy has so far advanced that
its termination would produce a live fetus (then child), such a
purpose cannot be served.
Significantly, the Supreme Court in its groundbreaking decision in Roe circumvented the issue. By adopting viability as the
criterion for constitutionally acceptable state regulation undertaken to protect the fetus, 60 the Court established a foundation
for prohibiting those abortions most likely to result in live
births. 61 But that analysis is merely a foundation: It only permits
states to take such protective action; it does not require them to
do so. 62 In addition, under Roe and the Court's subsequent decisions in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 62 (1976), and
In all of these cases, one issue ~as whether plaintiff-parents had a cause of action in tort
against medical personnel who were allegedly negligent in failing to inform them of a
substantial risk that a particular pregnancy might result in the birth of a defective child,
where the parents claimed that they would have elected to terminate the pregnancy had
they possessed such information. See also Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451
F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (negligent genetic testing). Cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 389 & n.8 (1979) (discerning possible conflict between time required to detect some
genetic defects and the restriction of abortions where "sufficient reason to believe that the
fetus may be viable").
59. See Delgado & Keyes, Parental Preferences and Selective Abortion: A Commentary on Roe v. Wade, Doe v. Bolton, and the Shape of Things to Come, 1974 WASH. U.
L.Q. 203; Note, State Protection of the Viable Unborn Child After Roe v. Wade: How
Little, How Late, 37 LA. L. REV. 270, 280 (1976); Note, supra note 57, at 901-11. Cf. note
57 supra (satisfaction of motivating interests).
60. 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
61. See Tribe, supra note 53, at 26-29.
The Court's subsequent elaboration of the viability concept in Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), is not to the contrary. There, in upholding a Missouri
statutory definition of viability as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the
unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial lifesupportive systems," 428 U.S. at 63, the Court emphasized that a determination of viability "is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician,"
428 U.S. at 64, and observed that the Missouri definition actually allows greater freedom
to those electing abortion than does the definition offered in Roe, 428 U.S. at 64. This
latter point demonstrates the permissive, as distinguished from mandatory, nature of the
timetable set forth in Roe. See 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). See also Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379 (1979) (statutory requirement that person performing abortion must protect
fetal life if, inter alia, sufficient reason to believe fetus may be viable is unconstitutionally
vague).
62. The Court stated: "For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother." 410 U.S. at 164-65 (emphasis added).
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Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), viability - the potential ability of the fetus to live outside the mother's womb, albeit
with artificial aid 63 - is a factual determination to be predicated
not upon a universal or fixed point in gestation, but rather upon
individualized, fetus-by-fetus assessments. 64
The difficulty of applying this rule to particular cases is illustrated by a recent opinion of a three-judge district court in South
Carolina enjoining the criminal prosecution of a physician for
illegal abortion and murder after he terminated an approximately
twenty-five week pregnancy and the fetus, delivered alive, survived for twenty days, Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp. 535 (D. S.
C. 1977), vacated and remanded per curiam, 440 U.S. 445 (1979).
The court apparently reasoned that, because the fetus could not
survive outside the womb indefinitely, but only for twenty days,
it was not viable; 65 thus, it held that the state could not prosecute
the physician without violating the constitutional constraints of
Roe and Planned Parenthood. 65
Whether or not such reasoning is sound, 67 it highlights the
difficulty of accurately assessing the viability of any individual
fetus before the termination of a pregnancy (and hence the difficulty of determining whether any particular abortion will be
likely in fact to advance the cause of population control). 08 To
suggest, as Judge Everett does, that New Gotham cannot en63. 410 U.S. at 160.
64. See 410 U.S. at 160-61; Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976);
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,388 (1979); Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp, 535,539 (D.
S.C. 1977), vacated and remanded per curiam, 440 U.S. 445 (1979).
65. 440 F. Supp. at 538.
66. 440 F. Supp. at 538-39.
67. By focusing on the actual life span of the fetus, once removed from the womb,
rather than its potential ability to survive, the opinion implies that viability is a determination that can be made only after the termination of the pregnancy in question. See 440
F. Supp. at 538. Roe v. Wade, however, defined a viable fetus as one "potentially able to
live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." 410 U.S. at 160. In a subsequent
opinion, the Court explained that viability, so defined, nonetheless contemplates more
than "momentary survival." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979). See also
Anders v. Floyd, 440 U.S. 445 (1979) (per curiam), vacating and remanding 440 F. Supp.
535 (D.S.C. 1977); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1316 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed
for want of jurisdiction sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), affd., 599 F.2d 193
(7th Cir. 1979).
68. Predicting the actual impact of any abortion upon population growth or control
would appear to require even more difficult determinations than assessing viability. Presumably a fetus that lives for twenty days following abortion would have a de minimis
effect on the size of New Gotham's population; such a fetus might, however, properly be
classified as viable, according to the Supreme Court definition of that term in Roe, 410
U.S. at 160, and notwithstanding the conclusion to the contrary reached in Floyd v.
Anders, 440 F. Supp_. 535 (D.S.C. 1977), vacated and remanded per curiam, 440 U.S. 445
(1979). See note 67 supra.
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courage terminations of advanced pregnancies is•to ignore these
vagaries inherent in the notion of viability. 69 And, to the extent
that any abortion, whenever performed, increases the risk of
death to the particular fetus in question, 70 New Gotham's decision to encourage abortions throughout pregnancy rather than
during a more limited period of gestation is consistent with the
underlying goal of promoting population control to the fullest
extent possible. 71 That live births may result, even when the city
successfully encourages indigent women to procure abortions,
provides an additional reflection of the noncoercive and nonabsolute nature of the governmental action challenged here and of the
minimal level of constitutional scrutiny against which we are to
measure it. 72
None of these efforts to respond to Judge Everett's dissent,
of course, need be read to say that the action pursued by New
Gotham is wise or humane·, for we do not decide such cases on
those grounds, see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,479 (1977). Rather,
whatever the apparent infirmities of the city's course, the
abortion-funding cases, together with the additional support of
other Supreme Court decisions, point ineluctably to its validity.
69. See note 67 supra. See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-93 (1979).
70. The method of abortion used becomes significant in this analysis. In Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976), the Court discussed a number of
different methods of abortion employed after the first trimester. One of those, saline
amniocentesis, almost invariably causes fetal death while another, prostaglandin instilla-·
tion, stimulates premature labor, more likely resulting in a live birth. See Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 399 (1979); Note, supra note 59, at 279-80.
71. See note 51 supra.
72. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.

